


CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion



Why I Will Vote:

REPUBLICAN

Paul G. Hoffman

IN FOUR short years President Eisenhower has (1) transformed the Republican Party from a party which too often had its eyes on the past to a party planning eagerly for the future, a future with constantly expanding opportunities for all Americans, (2) greatly improved the moral and political climate within the USA, and (3) ended the Korean war and substantially improved the opportunity for achieving a durable peace. That is why I am going to vote with enthusiasm the Republican ticket on November sixth.

The extent of the changes which have taken place within the Republican Party are not too well recognized even by Republicans themselves. As the Eisenhower administration got under way a substantial majority of the Republican state, county and congressional leaders were far from sympathetic with Eisenhower's progressive international and national programs. Today those programs have the support of most of the leaders. This is due in part to the emergence of a new and younger leadership. Forty-one of the new state chairmen of the

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DEMOCRATIC

Chester Bowles

THERE ARE two general criteria by which a presidential candidate must be judged. First, he should be examined for his qualities as an individual. This means an appraisal of his integrity, his courage, his intelligence.

And second, he should be examined for his ability to act. This means an appraisal of the party to which he owes allegiance and from which he must draw his associates.

I have met and talked with General Eisenhower on several occasions in the last ten years, and I like and respect him. I respect the man who rose so rapidly from the rank of colonel in 1940 to assume the leadership of our forces in the European war. I also respect the attractive 1952 newcomer to American political and economic life.

Furthermore, I feel that the Eisenhower administration has been something of a milestone in American history. It has marked the triumph of a twenty-year social and economic revolution, for it has brought acceptance of that revolution by the Republican Party—however belated and

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Special Election Issue —

We are fortunate in being able to present two very distinguished spokesmen for the Republican and Democratic Parties. Paul Hoffman, Chairman of the Board of the Fund for the Republic, was recently appointed by the President as a U. S. representative to the United Nations. He previously served as administrator of the Marshall Plan. Chester Bowles, after holding several important federal positions during the war, was elected Governor of Connecticut and then was appointed Ambassador to India. We are also grateful to E. E. Schattschneider, Chairman of the John E. Andrus Center of Public Affairs at Wesleyan University, for his illuminating exposition of the political realities in this campaign year of 1956.

THE EDITORS.

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Has Partisanship Declined?

IT MAY be difficult to define the differences between the major parties in any case, but it is utterly impossible to define them to the satisfaction of partisans on both sides. To begin, no authoritative statement of policy binding on the whole organization can be made by anyone in either party. Both parties are so latitudinarian that every forecast of party action contains an element of guesswork in spite of the fact that public men discuss party policy endlessly and passionately. This is not to say that the differences are unimportant; the substance of the conflict is elusive because it is important.

Has the area of agreement between the major parties increased since 1952? Several answers are possible. The parties have always operated within the framework of a wide consensus. They agree about so many things, about so many unstated assumptions, that the struggle can be sustained by the political system without dangerous breaches in the social structure, like a family quarrel in which plain speaking is possible because the bonds of union are very strong. The area of agreement is greater than it seems because the parties talk only about the things that divide them. In spite of appearances to the contrary the opposition does not oppose everything that the party in power proposes, no more than the batter in a baseball game tries to hit every pitch. There is a tremendous lot of picking and choosing in the development of an issue.

First, it is necessary to distinguish between what the parties *say* and what they *do*. Some allowance must be made for the tendency of people to overstate the unity and resolution of their own supporters. The orators tend to live off each other to some extent, ignoring the likelihood that on the showdown more moderate counsels are likely to prevail on all sides. Second, party issues often are highly perishable. Democracy is a process of resolving conflict, moving from disagreement to definition, to decision, and to acceptance. This is the way in which the work of democracy gets done. The periodic tendency to reduce the distance between the parties does not demonstrate that the conflict has ceased to be meaningful, any more than the highly competitive bidding in the market

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

is collusive merely because the competitors deal in very small margins of difference. The abandonment of unproductive and unprofitable issues proves only that the competitors are skillful; a good political leader demonstrates his virtuosity by his capacity to clear the decks of the junk and clutter of yesterday's political business.

The Nature of Party Conflict

To understand the nature of party conflict it is necessary, therefore, to consider *the function of the cleavages exploited by the parties in their struggle for control of the government*. Party conflict is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the contestants agree in advance on a definition of the issues. The development of cleavages is the prime instrument of power because every cleavage reallocates power. For this reason it is rare that the parties *can* agree on a definition of the issues; the party which is able to make its definition prevail is likely to take over the government. The parties can no more agree about what the issues are than the generals can agree in advance on the choice of battlefields or the alignment of their troops, because battles are won by forcing the enemy to fight where he does not want to fight. An analogous logic in party conflict produces a perpetual dispute about disputes, and the stake in the contradictory interpretations of the conflict is power.

For this reason there are always a number of unavowed conflicts in politics. Some of these conflicts cannot be exploited because they are inconsistent with others. The parties are forced to choose among conflicts. Some controversies must be subordinated because neither side could survive the ensuing struggle; others cannot be exploited because no party could accept the challenge without disaster. The conflict between the few and the many (the rich and the poor) is built into the American system but no party could afford to espouse openly the cause of the few against the many. In some ways democracy itself is the overriding issue in American politics, but it is impossible to take an openly anti-democratic position in the United States and survive. Neither of the major parties could afford to be pro- or

anti-Catholic, pro-segregation, or anti-immigrant, nor could they come out for abolition of the income tax or repeal of the social security system. There is a perpetual conflict between the parties growing out of attempts to implicate each other in impossible situations of this sort just as there is a perpetual effort to isolate each other. To say it crudely, all radical proposals for the reorganization of American politics propose to isolate the rich. The parties cannot agree about these things because the schemes of one party are the ruination of the other. The strategy is to find the winning cleavage, as far as possible to make it dominant, to subordinate inconsistent cleavages, and to resist all attempts by the opposition to develop competing or inconsistent cleavages.

Finally, the parties may agree for reasons that are wholly inconsistent and contradictory. A conservative party may be willing to make concessions as the price of victory, whereas a liberal party may moderate its demands in order to widen its appeal. The parties may therefore arrive at the center by different routes and each is apt, therefore, to distrust the motives of the other. This is a very special kind of agreement.

I am by no means suggesting that party leaders are conscienceless men lacking in conviction and willing to take any position likely to get them into power. All I mean to say is that power is utterly implicated in party conflict and the problem of political leaders is made difficult by the fact that power, like money, is multi-functional. The priorities of political leaders are never easy to establish because every position taken is apt to have consequences for all other positions. This is especially true when power means control of the richest and most resourceful government in the world. Politics is about deeply felt differences but the very fact that people care very much about it produces a strategic conflict which complicates the whole discussion.

The Issues of '56

The party platforms drafted at the recent national conventions partake of the quality of the whole dispute about disputes. We shall know more about the subject as the campaign develops, but almost certainly there will remain large areas of confusion. This seems inevitable. Confusion is profoundly characteristic of all serious conflict. All war correspondence dwells on the fog of war. Party politics is not like a tennis match—neat, orderly, and precise—it is much too important to

be tidy. It has been said of Napoleon that what seemed like chaos to others looked like a golden opportunity to him. It takes intelligence to make sense of American politics.

Tariffs

The attitudes of the parties toward specific issues seem to have undergone a great deal of revision within recent years. No issue is historically closer to the focus of the interests of the Republican Party than the protective tariff, a major preoccupation of the party since its origin. The position of the party has changed greatly since Mr. Grundy said in 1930 that the protective tariff was second only to the Christian religion in his opinion. There has been no major congressional revision of the tariff in twenty-six years. It is noteworthy that the Republican congressional party did not undertake a general tariff revision when it came back into power in 1947 and 1953. This is a departure from the practice of having a congressional revision of the tariff every six years, a practice that almost made tariff legislation the principal business of Congress. Republican congressional votes on extensions of the Trade Agreements Act indicate that there is a substantial residual Republican hostility to the new tariff policy adopted by the Democrats in 1934, but this has taken the form of restrictive amendments to the Act and not of wholesale congressional revisions. Meanwhile, powerful big business interests long friendly to the Republican Party have shown a desire for a more liberal foreign trade policy. The conflict within the party seems to be roughly parallel to the Taft-Eisenhower cleavage in 1952. On the other hand, the migration of the textile industry to the South has produced some Southern Democratic protectionist sentiment. The whole issue has been subordinated to the question of foreign economic aid and must be understood in that relation. One gets the feeling that the Eisenhower administration, which espouses a more liberal trade policy generally, has not been fully effective in giving the party a new direction in this regard and that, on the other hand, the Democratic leadership has been less successful than it might have been in exploiting the breach in the business community. The situation suggests one of the deeper meanings of Democratic moderation in recent years.

Agriculture

As concerns agriculture the Eisenhower administration has abandoned one kind of rhetorical

opposition to the Democratic crop limitation and price support policies and has substituted another kind perhaps to conceal the fact that both parties are baffled by the problem. The confusing struggle about fixed and flexible price supports suggests the existence of an underlying difference of opinion as to the role of the government in the painful process of adjustment which has been going on in American agriculture ever since World War I. Involved in this struggle is a complex of policies and programs, but at the core of the conflict is to be found a recurring difference of attitudes toward the use of public power and resources to ease economic pressure on small farmers. One of the advantages of the alternation of the parties in power is that it introduces a degree of fluidity and diversity into the consideration of public policy because sometimes one party can do things that the other party cannot do. At this writing it is difficult to predict with confidence the future of party policy in this field, but the alternation of the parties in power is likely to provide a continuing opportunity to evolve policy.

Social Security

The Republican Party has abandoned also its early opposition to the social security system as a whole, an opposition which seems incredible as we now look back on it. The issue between the parties has become very largely a question of a little more or a little less, the Democratic Party being on the side of a little more, and the Republican Party tending to be on the side of a little less.

Labor

Despite the platforms, prospects for a major revision of the Taft-Hartley Act await a shift in political power presently beyond the short-range horizon of policy makers. The focus of interest is less on the legislation itself than it is in the *administration* of the law which is susceptible of some extremely anti-labor interpretations. On the other hand, the labor movement is now so large and so formidable that a union-busting political movement to wreck organized labor is very nearly outside of the realm of practical politics. Illustrative of the real differences between the parties has been the reluctance of the government to intervene in a series of protracted strikes in recent months perhaps on the assumption that government intervention tends to be pro-labor. A somewhat similar generalization might be made about public policy concerning business monopolies. The controversy deals less with new legislation

than the administration of legislation that has been on the books for a long time. In this regard the energy and determination of the law enforcement officials or the lack of energy and enthusiasm of these officials are likely to make current policy regardless of the language of the statutes. Here again a Republican administration has tended to minimize the role of the government.

Government and Business

The Administration has strongly opposed an extension of public power and conservation projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. That is, it has been unenthusiastic about the T.V.A. and has resisted proposals for the establishment of new valley authorities elsewhere. Instead it has tended to favor the private exploitation of water power and the mineral and timber resources in the national domain. At this point a sharp party issue has developed and the underlying attitudes of the parties toward the business community are probably as well marked here as in any other zone of public policy. Other illustrations can be found in numerous instances in which governmental activities have been restricted or abolished, partly in the name of economy and partly in the name of getting the government out of business. The action in these instances is more significant as an indication of the temper of the party than it is for the intrinsic importance of the individual cases, such as, for example, the restriction of the activities of the United States Weather Bureau in the interest of private weather forecasters and a number of cases in which work is now done by private contractors rather than by federal agencies.

The Budget

Nowhere has the present Administration labored with greater resolution than it has in its effort to balance the budget. On the face of the record, balancing the budget has been the key policy of the Administration. Nearly everything else seems to have been subordinated to it and Mr. Humphrey, as Secretary of the Treasury and chief exponent of the policy, has acquired a reputation for being the strong man of the Administration. The value placed by the Administration on the balancing of the budget is illustrated by its willingness to go to great lengths to make a showing: making economies that cannot be repeated, such as using up unexpended appropriations carried over from previous years and emptying the pipe lines supplying a variety of governmental programs at home

and abroad. Equally suggestive are the remarkable proposals made by the Administration for financing a new highway construction program by borrowing money outside the debt structure of the national government. The budget itself is the crucial policy of the Administration. So important has this policy been that it has had a major effect on both defense policy and foreign policy.

Foreign Policy

Broadly speaking, the Eisenhower administration has taken over the foreign policy of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This represents another shift of an historic position for a Republican administration. As is always the case, however, substantial differences between the parties appear even when they seem to be doing the same thing. Partly this is a question of the *conduct* of the foreign policy rather than its *content*, partly it is a consequence of the primacy of the budget, and partly it results from the attempt to meet the new world situation that has arisen during the President's illness. While it is true that the Eisenhower administration has abandoned the historic isolationist position of the Republican Party, it is true also that the center of gravity in the Republican Party in Congress is substantially more on the isolationist side than the center of gravity in the Democratic Party. The consequence is that the congressional support of the Eisenhower foreign policy has been wider than the congressional base of either of the parties, but conspicuously dependent on the Democratic congressional party at nearly every crucial point. The Democratic Party is, therefore, in a somewhat unusual position for an opposition party of being more in favor of the Administration foreign policy than the Republican Party is and sometimes than the Administration itself.

Taxation

The composition of the two major parties makes an underlying difference inevitable as concerns taxation regardless of the language used by the parties or the specific day-to-day measures espoused by them. Nominally both parties are in favor of tax reduction, but the question of who pays how much for what is not likely to be resolved in the same way by the parties. The policy of the Republican Party when it was in control of the presidency and Congress was to first reduce taxes on the upper income brackets. Since then it has resisted efforts to reduce taxes in the lower income brackets in the name of balancing the budget.

It is unlikely that the priorities of the Democratic Party would have been the same had they been in a similar situation. Obviously, the whole disposition of the two parties is different at this point.

Communists-in-Government

Something should be said about the much discussed communists-in-government issue. Both parties are opposed to communism. Nevertheless, the attempt to raise this issue against the Democratic Party several years ago opened up the most deeply partisan conflict in modern American history. Much of the current feeling that the intensity of party conflict has diminished has been due to the deflation of the communists-in-government issue in the past two years. How is the collapse of McCarthyism to be accounted for? The interest of the Republican Party in the issue declined sharply when (1) it discovered that Senator McCarthy was able to use the issue against the Eisenhower administration almost as effectively as he had used it against the Democrats, (2) when the election of 1954 proved that it had lost its popular appeal, and (3) when congressional committee chairmanships passed to Democrats. Behind these developments was doubtless a general shift of opinion. This is a good time to take measures to revise congressional and administrative procedures to make a recurrence of witch hunts less likely although the wounds inflicted in this bitter fight may still be too sore to permit bipartisan action.

The Negro Question

The future of the Negro in the American community is the greatest challenge to American democracy in our time, but it has not been well developed as a party issue because the question embarrasses both sides. Historically the position of the Republican Party has been ambivalent. As the party of the Reconstruction, the Republican Party has had an historical commitment to win for the Negro a better position in the community. On the other hand, the Republican conservatives in the North and Democratic Bourbons in the South seem to have worked out a sort of tacit system of antagonistic cooperation by virtue of which both sides treated race relations as a local southern question. The collaboration of the southern and northern conservatives originated in the great political crisis of 1890's and has played a tremendous role in American politics ever since. *Both parties are now disturbed by the fact that*

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WHY I WILL VOTE REPUBLICAN

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Republican Party are solid Eisenhower men. One hundred of the 156 members of the National Committee of 1952 have been replaced by new faces. There have also been converts from the ranks of the ultraconservatives. The President has convinced quite a number of them that the future of the country and the world will best be assured by a middle-of-the-road program at home and cooperation with other free nations on the international front.

A clarification and sharpening of Eisenhower's domestic program has also been a unifying influence within the party. There has been growing recognition that the new Republican program represents a fundamental change from both the New Deal and the Fair Deal. Inherent in the New Deal and the Fair Deal was the concept that the government should accept responsibility for safeguarding the people from the cradle to the grave. No one could be more deeply concerned with the welfare of the people than President Eisenhower, but he believes that it will be forwarded *not* by paternalism but by helping people to help themselves. He has great faith in people and what they can do. He believes that the basic responsibility of the government is to provide conditions making it possible for everyone to realize his capacities for growth, leaving him free to travel as fast and as far as his abilities will carry him. Under the paternalistic philosophy the emphasis is on direct help; under the Eisenhower philosophy it is on expanding opportunity. In my opinion, there is a vast difference between these two concepts.

On the other hand, the New Republicanism is fully cognizant that social security, unemployment insurance, employer liability and so on is not only a legitimate responsibility of government but a vital one. I can remember the day not too many years ago when certain party leaders still talked seriously about jettisoning all social legislation which was "democratic" in character and origin. Those days are gone forever. And the man who put an end to them is Eisenhower. While I am on the subject, I should add that our Democratic rivals have accused us now and again of adopting their political ideas. So we have—the good ones. Why shouldn't we? What we are seeking is social progress. We would be foolish to act on the assumption that an idea to be good had to carry a Republican label.

Improvement in Moral and Political Climate

The changes which have taken place in the moral and political climate in the United States in the past four years have been many and far reaching. One of the most significant to me is the dissolution of the suspicion, hatred and hysteria so characteristic of the early 1950's. Another is the restoration of confidence in government and government officials as a result of the rigid standards of honesty enforced by the President. Most important of all is a new unity in our fight against international communism. In 1951 and 1952 the air was filled with claims and counter claims by the Republicans and Democrats as to who were the really effective battlers against communism, with charges and counter charges as to who was "soft" on communism. Literally hundreds of thousands of good people were fighting other hundreds of thousands of good people over an issue on which there was no real difference of opinion. By 1950 there was not more than a handful of treasonable or maladjusted people who gave even a trace of support to this weird Marxian ideology. Except for these few everyone hated communism.

President Eisenhower has exercised a calming influence in this situation. He has taken a strong position against the extremists in his own party who were claiming patriotism as an exclusive prerogative of the Republicans. He insists that party affiliation is no index of patriotism. He has urged that all good people join forces and thus insure victory in the struggle between the free world and the Communist world, which has been aptly called "the struggle of the century for the century."

Improvement in Prospects for Peace

It is in the all-important area of waging the peace that President Eisenhower has made his most notable contributions. Four years ago he was recognized throughout the world for his military achievements. Today he is recognized as a man utterly dedicated to the cause of peace. In April, 1953, I went to India to confer with Nehru. In the past the Indian Prime Minister had occasionally expressed some doubts about American generals as peaceful men. It soon became evident that he had not quite resolved these doubts in regard to Eisenhower. As it happened, I had just received an advance copy of a speech the President was scheduled to make that very noon. So, when Nehru expressed some puzzlement about the President,

I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, perhaps I can help explain the President to you. His mother was strongly pacifist. Her influence was strong in his life. His great hope is to help lead the world to peace. To prove it I would like to read a few paragraphs from an address the President made just a few minutes ago to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington." I read excerpts from that famous speech urging an end to the armaments race.

Nehru was visibly affected. After a moment, he said, "Your President is a very great man, and clearly a man of peace."

The recognition that President Eisenhower is a man dedicated to peace is of paramount importance from the standpoint of the position of the United States vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Without it we could not exercise the necessary leadership for peace because peoples on both sides of all Curtains are violently opposed to warmongering.

Somewhat paradoxically, President Eisenhower's military background makes him particularly effective in working for peace. This background renders him immune to attacks upon his courage and judgment in crises. He can safely conciliate when someone else might be accused of "softness" to communism. He can ignore provocations when a civilian might be accused of seeking "peace at any price." When public passion is inflamed by an incident such as the imprisonment of American fliers by Red China, he can talk softly where pressures might unnerve a civilian into risky action. Having been first in war, he can be first in peace without apology. It is idle to speculate on whether America would or would not have become involved in war under some president other than Eisenhower. This can be said with confidence—that he has used every facility at his command both to end the Korean war and to keep us out of other wars. No man could have done more. I personally doubt if anyone could have done as much.

What About the Next Four Years?

President Eisenhower was strongly tempted not to run for a second term. On the other hand, when he became certain that his recovery was going to be complete and his health excellent, it was quite inevitable that he would accept this second call to duty. He believes that now is the time when he can really be of service to his party and his country by doing all he can to perpetuate it. In another four years the GOP will become

committed to the New Republicanism in a manner that will end, once and for all, all loose talk about Eisenhower's ascendancy being more the temporary personal triumph of an individual than a permanent step forward in political thinking. That's why this election is of supreme importance.

What can we expect of this "New Republicanism" under Eisenhower's leadership in the next four years? These will be years of tremendous change. In fact, there will be more change in the next ten or fifteen years than there were in the first fifty years of this century.

The New Republicanism accepts wholeheartedly the philosophy that farmers and working men are entitled to protection against the extraordinary risks that are part of modern society. Included are price supports, the Soil Bank, unemployment compensation and old-age pensions.

The New Republicanism will urge federal aid for schools without in any way interfering with the traditional rights of the States or communities. It recognizes the need for a vast increase in both school facilities and teaching personnel. It envisions a society in which higher education will be available to all without regard for financial status.

The New Republicanism accepts responsibility for making a reality out of the phrase, "equality of opportunity." It will see the beginnings of the dissolution of old prejudices in the South and the gradual implementation of our classic safeguards—already more extensive than in any other civilization the world has ever known—to the civil liberties of all citizens in all parts of the country. The President leaves no doubt as to the intent of the New Republicanism when he says, "We cannot have a first-class nation when it still has second-class citizens."

The New Republicanism knows that the world is round and shrinking. It knows, to quote President Eisenhower himself, that "in our modern world, it is madness to suppose that there could be an island of tranquillity and prosperity in a sea of wretchedness and frustration," and that there is "the urgent need for mutual economic and military cooperation among the free nations, sufficient to deter or repel aggression wherever it may threaten." It knows that new nations have been born and will be born which will look to us for encouragement and help.

The New Republicanism is in a unique position in regard to pressure groups. Pressure groups have a legitimate part to play in American politics. It is both reasonable and right for farmers, business-

men and workers to organize and fight for their interests. It is unfortunate, however, if a party is so beholden to any one group that the group is in a position to exert undue pressure. The New Republicanism draws its support from all manner and kinds of people. Its only obligation is to those who want nothing from government except good government.

But beyond and above all else, the New Republicanism believes that through the acceptance of such proposals as Atoms-for-Peace and Open Skies, through a freer interchange of ideas among people and by steadily lowering trade barriers we can make highly improbable the outbreak of a general war. But that is not enough. The New Republicanism knows that we must not only establish bonds of friendship with free peoples but take advantage of every opportunity to communicate with the people behind the Curtains. There is a reservoir of friendship for America among the people of Russia and China that we should tap. The New Republicanism believes that if we wage the peace in this manner it is not too much to hope that within the next four years we can see the beginnings of the first durable peace men have ever known.

WHY I WILL VOTE DEMOCRATIC

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grudging its acceptance may be. Collective bargaining, labor unions, a comprehensive system of social security, and federal responsibility for the maintenance of full employment have at last been recognized as permanent elements within our society. Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal is clearly here to stay.

The integrity and amiability of the chief executive are not issues in this campaign. But what of his capacity to move us along new lines, to tackle the grave new problems which are emerging on both the domestic and foreign affairs fronts?

Deficiencies of the Eisenhower Administration

It is here that we find the glaring deficiencies of the Eisenhower administration. They are deficiencies which have slowed down our progress in social welfare legislation at home. And they are deficiencies which have allowed us to drift perilously close to disaster abroad.

Men who have bitterly fought welfare legislation for a generation are not the men best suited to administer that legislation, whatever their re-

luctant acceptance of it. They are even less well suited to the essential task of extending it.

This truth has been demonstrated in the Republican administration's record in social welfare since 1953. A single interest—big business—has gained an unparalleled position of power in our economic and political life. Key natural resources which belong to the American people have been turned over to private ownership for private profit.

Federal aid to our woefully inadequate public school system has been rejected through cynical Republican-dominated maneuver in the House of Representatives. Precious vaccine distribution has been imperiled through disinclination to accept federal responsibility.

In spite of pre-election promises to the contrary, a one-sided labor law has remained unchanged. In a time of urban abundance and prosperity the plight of the farmer has been worsened by a narrow approach which looks on agricultural surpluses in a hungry, ill-clad world, not as an opportunity but as a curse and which blandly assumes that the liquidation of the family farm is a mark of progress.

Neither political party can claim anything that approaches an unblemished record on civil rights. But the Democratic Party has at least supported legislation that opened new doors of economic and political opportunity to our Negro fellow-Americans, while the Republican Party has by and large opposed this legislation. The President has also missed a unique opportunity to fill the present moral vacuum by throwing the influence of his high office behind the Supreme Court decision on segregation. Such leadership has not been forthcoming.

With such a shoddy record in the administration of existing domestic legislation, it is little wonder that new proposals which would direct a fraction of our increasing wealth to the more rapid elimination of our slums, to the modernization of our school system and the more adequate compensation of our teachers, to an expanded school lunch program for the three out of four children who are now outside this system, on an easing of the burden of catastrophic illness, to the raising of the economic floor under the eight million American families who live on less than \$2000 a year, have not been forthcoming.

A "milestone" administration can serve as a useful marker for historians. But it is not, by definition, a very mobile or imaginative adminis-

tration. Furthermore, the transformation from milestone to millstone can be abrupt.

A Caretaker Party

Traditionally, the Republican Party in this century has been a caretaker party. It can on occasion clean old machinery and tidy up newly installed machinery. But it has persuasively demonstrated its inability to create new machinery to cope with new situations.

Nowhere is this judgment more valid than in the Eisenhower administration's record in foreign affairs since 1953. It is here that harm has been done which far outweighs the comfort of a new, belated national agreement on already established social welfare gains and the luxury of Mr. Eisenhower's proposed eight-year program to modernize the Republican Party. It is here that we confront issues demanding the kind of action of which the Republican Party is today incapable.

The Republican Party won the 1952 election with the help of a totally false foreign policy position. Republican leaders recklessly pledged themselves to the liberation of Eastern Europe, to the reunification of Korea, and to the reacquisition of the Chinese mainland through an unleashed Chiang Kai-shek.

Inevitably, these preposterous political promises have remained unkept. Eastern Europe is still under tight Soviet control. Korea lies divided by an uneasy truce. The power of Communist China has been extended into the northern half of Vietnam, and its prestige has grown by leaps and bounds throughout Asia.

True, an end came to the shooting in Korea in the summer of 1953. But this truce was secured not by the election of Mr. Eisenhower but by the death of Stalin, on terms which the Chinese at Stalin's insistence had refused eight months earlier. And because of our failure to grasp the very real possibility of a split on this issue between China and Russia, we threw away a golden opportunity to bring not simply a precarious truce to Korea but a stable peace to all of Asia.

Clearly the Republican foreign policy promises of 1952 were impossible of fulfillment by any administration. Clearly, too, many of the retreats which the Republican administration felt called upon to make were inevitable.

What I deplore is not that these compromises were made, but that so many Republican leaders have had the audacity to hail them as triumphs, and to argue that the Republican Party should be

accepted by the American voters as the "party of peace." This, it seems to me, goes well beyond the normal limits of campaign demagoguery.

"Peace, Peace"

Any student of foreign affairs—and indeed any regular reader of the *New York Times* — must know how little reality lies behind this semantic sleight-of-hand. "Peace" strikes me as a hollow word in a world which contains the tension and bloodshed of Cyprus, Algeria, the Formosa Straits, the Israeli border, divided Korea, divided Vietnam, and divided Germany; a world that requires nearly three million young Americans under arms, with nuclear weapons growing more frighteningly destructive month by month, and with our disarmament efforts at a standstill. What peace we have is at best a peace achieved by nuclear terror.

Far from having moved closer to a *real* peace, I believe it is fair to say that our security position in this explosive world has deteriorated to a degree that few of us could have anticipated in 1952. And this deterioration has taken place in spite of the expenditure by the Eisenhower administration of \$160 billion for our armed forces in a four year period—three times our defense expenditure in any equal period of peace in our entire history.

Now let us look more carefully at the foreign policy record. Our entire defense perimeter from Japan to Iceland is in a state of decomposition, as nation after nation chafes against the narrow military nature of our foreign alliances.

Our inept diplomacy has further inflamed the already formidable passions of nationalism in the Middle East and has brought Soviet influence as never before, both to Suez and the Khyber Pass.

Our inability to formulate a responsible and consistent policy on colonialism has lost us the respect of tens of millions of peoples who are anxious to be our friends—not only in Asia and Africa, but in Europe and South America. Our insensitive, unimaginative methods have steadily increased our isolation from the two-thirds of the world who live in the undeveloped continents and who will ultimately constitute the world balance of power.

Point Four is still treated like an unwanted child. The disarmament initiative is still held by our adversaries. Instead of challenging Moscow to a moratorium on nuclear tests we stubbornly continue to pollute the world's atmosphere with

hydrogen bomb experiments in the face of warnings from our foremost scientists.

A reverse Iron Curtain of our own making still slows down the growth of cultural and people-to-people exchange. Our timid refusal to trust American reporters to visit Communist China at their own risk to report the facts to the readers of a free American press has made us appear to most of the world as ridiculous, arrogant, and even totalitarian.

The death of Stalin has brought profound new dimensions to the Soviet challenge. It has brought new perils but also new opportunities for the free world. Yet the Republican administration has continued to pursue the remnants of Democratic policies which were valid for the Russia of Stalin, but are now largely irrelevant to the Russia of Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Another Four Years . . .

Against the record of the past four years, what can we say of the next four years? The earnest, internationalist Republican minority still believes that President Eisenhower through some magic can tame the Republican Old Guard. It still talks hopefully of something called the New Republicanism. It still assures us that what we have witnessed is simply a difficult preparatory stage.

It admits that their advocates of political expediency have made things a bit difficult by insisting that nothing be done to upset the unity of the Republican Party in this election period. But it insists that somehow forthright and imaginative action in foreign policy will emerge out of the blue with the President's second term.

Is this rationalization really valid? If the Republicans should win this election, can we actually expect them suddenly to formulate and develop the new policies which are desperately needed to assure our security and influence in world affairs, policies which they have stubbornly refused to tackle during what should have been the political honeymoon of Mr. Eisenhower and his party?

To accomplish this near miracle they must overcome two formidable obstacles. The first is a direct creation of the political argument they are now pressing so irresponsibly: the postulate that all is well with the world. Against such self-induced complacency and deception, how could the new Administration possibly call on the American people and on Congress to support bold new policies to cope with the difficulties which we have refused so long to recognize?

This disadvantage is compounded by the very nature of the Republican Party. For the Republicans contain a built-in weakness which dates back to the days of World War I. This is the struggle between the isolationist and internationalist wings which has rent the party since the Lodge Republicans split with the William Howard Taft-Roosevelt Republicans and savagely destroyed the effectiveness of Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations.

This struggle was continued through the thirties. It found its pre-war focus in the battle between that great Republican internationalist, Wendell Wilkie, and the isolationists who opposed him so bitterly within his own party.

In the years after World War II this traditional Republican conflict burst forth again. In 1947, when President Truman took the initiative in pressing for a series of revolutionary measures to stem the tide of communism in Europe, the necessary legislation was viciously fought by the Republican Old Guard under Senator Robert Taft.

Ultimately the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and Point Four were all passed by a Democratic-Republican coalition. But right here is the essential point. The coalition consisted of four-fifths of the Democratic members of Congress and less than half of the Republicans. In spite of the inspired leadership of Senator Vandenberg the bulk of the Senate Republicans stuck stubbornly with the Old Guard.

Now what would have happened to the Western world if we had had a Republican President from 1945 to 1952? Let us assume that this President would have realized the need for action to check communism. Would he have felt free to press for this action through a coalition in which his own party would have provided far less than half of the total votes? Faced with this cruel political dilemma, would he not have been sorely tempted to sit tight? Is it too much to say that Europe might well have gone under?

This is precisely the situation which President Eisenhower faces today. He is ably served by a foreign service and other government specialists who are fully aware of the grave situation we face abroad. Yet he is faced with the fact that the Wendell Wilkie wing of the Republican Party has lost the battle for control. Where were the John McCloyes, the Eric Johnsons and the Paul Hoffmans at the Republican Convention in San Francisco?

For forty years the greatest weakness of the

Republican Party has been in the fact that it has contained so few such liberal internationalists, and that it has paid so little attention to those it has had.

Democratic Victory Essential

In this 1956 election year these political descendants of Henry Stimson, Elihu Root and Wendell Wilkie find themselves neutralized, as never before, within their own administration. Their growing impotence within Republican Party councils is largely the reason for my conviction that a Democratic victory in November is essential, not only to assure our national growth, but to prevent a catastrophe in our relations with other nations.

Now that the leadership has been firmly grasped by Old Guard leaders such as Messrs. Knowland, Bridges, Bricker, Jenner, Martin, Halleck, and Nixon, the only way the Administration can maintain the necessary degree of party unity is to sweep foreign policy under the rug. In so doing a degree of Republican Party harmony is assured. But if this goes on for another four years the damage to our national security and to our hopes for a world of peace and understanding may well prove irreparable.

I have known Adlai Stevenson since our school days together. I have found him to be a profound student of foreign affairs and during the present campaign he has stated his beliefs clearly and courageously.

He possesses in abundance the personal qualifications which the office of President demands. In particular he has the intellect, the imagination, courage, and vigor to lead in the formulation of new affirmative policies at home and abroad that will enable us to recapture the initiative, to begin to build the solid foundation of a lasting peace, and to help increase man's awareness of his own dignity and worth as a child of God.

Most important of all, Adlai Stevenson has behind him the party which, whatever its imperfections, has traditionally led in the fight for increased social justice. This is a party which can implement the policies we require at home by responsibly expanding the welfare legislation which it originated in the last quarter century. This is a party which has the will and the unity in foreign affairs to launch the affirmative policies which are so urgently needed to deal with the changing and radically new world in which we find ourselves.

Let me say, in the midst of the present campaign partisanship, that all thoughtful Democrats retain

the deepest respect for liberal international Republicans such as Paul Hoffman, John McCloy and others who have served their country with such distinction in the field of foreign affairs.

If Adlai Stevenson is elected on November sixth, we hope they will join with us in a bipartisan program which will face up boldly not only to the dangers, but to the opportunities which we face across the seas.

HAS PARTISANSHIP CEASED?

(continued from page 133)

race relations have become a national issue. At a time when the Republican Party is attempting to become a respectable party in the South it is embarrassed by the political demands of a growing Negro population in the great industrial states in the North. The Democratic Party, a national party, is even more acutely disturbed by the issue because it splits the party down the middle. Tension within the Democratic Party is related to the altered position of the Solid South in American politics; the strain on party loyalty in the South has been excruciating. The attitude of Southern Democratic leaders is affected also by the growth of the Republican Party in their states. There are some grounds for hoping that the rise of a younger group of party leaders in the North and the South may lead to a new approach to an old problem within the ranks of the Democratic Party, a hope intensified by the nomination of Mr. Stevenson. A *modus vivendi* in the Democratic Party is important because the Democratic Party is the principal political meeting place of northern and southern political leaders. Both parties are treating the question tentatively and cautiously, illustrating the proposition that the parties do not exploit every cleavage in the community.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates the proposition that there is a pattern of substantial differences between the parties which persists even in a period of diminishing partisanship and changing policy.

The Nationalization of American Politics

Neither of the parties is wholly free to pursue a flexible policy. However, the Democratic Party continues to be a loose working arrangement between a left-of-center northern wing and a conservative southern one-party monopoly. The status of the southern monopoly is buttressed by the use of a multitude of anti-democratic devices such as gerrymanders, rural over-representation

in the state legislatures, the Georgia county-unit system, rotten borough systems, and other similar devices by which the dominant party in a one-party area seeks to intrench itself. Nevertheless, the Solid South is under continuing and increasing tension from within and without. Under these circumstances the Democratic Party can pursue two different strategies: (1) the present policy of maintaining unity by attempting to discover the political center of gravity within the party. Acceptance of this policy by Southern Democrats has been facilitated by the realization that an independent southern political line is likely to be chiefly advantageous to the Republicans. (2) Opposed to this policy is the strategy of disregarding the South attributed to Mr. Harriman several years ago. The second policy might eventually produce a liberal majority based on the great industrial states of the North; it would also greatly intensify the differences between the major parties and involves great political hazards. The temper of the times seems to be unfavorable to so drastic a political gamble.

The Republican Party similarly is a captive of its own make-up. It also is dependent on gerrymanders, rural over-representation and rotten borough systems in widespread areas of its northern base. The result is that it is a far more conservative party than it might be otherwise, and the reform of the Republican Party has been impeded by its dependence on these props. Consequently, the whole position of the party has been unsettled by the erosion of its old sectional base in large northern one-party Republican areas since 1932; the development of a strong Democratic Party in the North and West has placed the whole traditional Republican structure under tension. Both parties have been greatly affected by the nationalization of American politics which has not only weakened the old sectional foundations of the system but has

greatly increased the likelihood that the parties will alternate in power more frequently than they have in the past. The nationalization of American politics is likely to have a profound influence on public policy because the outcome of any political conflict is greatly affected by its *scope*. A new political universe is being opened up by the decline of sectionalism.

American politics begins as a struggle between people who have money and the people who have votes but is greatly modified and sometimes sublimated by the fact that both sides share a great humane tradition. The conflict is built into a community that is at once capitalistic and democratic but the community survives because the conflict is not a naked contest for wealth or power.

The diminution of the passions of party conflict suggests that some old issues are being abandoned while both parties reformulate their policies and their alignments. This is good because it tends to bring politics up-to-date, but there is little danger that we shall have too much agreement. The demands on the government are now so great and so difficult that the raw materials of conflict are likely to be produced in sufficient abundance to sustain the political system. Conflict *per se* is not bad. It is the price of change and progress and the expansion and health of the community.

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